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HOW	TO	TEACH	QUANTUM	MECHANICS1	
	David	Albert	Columbia	University			
Abstract		I	distinguish	between	two	conceptually	different	kinds	of	physical	space:	a	space	of	
ordinary	material	bodies,	which	is	the	space	of	points	at	which	I	could	imaginably	place	(say)	the	tip	of	my	finger,	or	the	center	of	a	billiard-ball,	and	a	space	of	
elementary	physical	determinables,	which	is	the	smallest	space	of	points	such	that	stipulating	what	is	happening	at	each	one	of	those	points,	at	every	time,	amounts	to	an	exhaustive	physical	history	of	the	universe.		In	all	classical	physical	theories,	these	two	spaces	happen	to	coincide	–	and	what	we	mean	by	calling	a	theory	“classical”,	and	all	we	mean	by	calling	a	theory	“classical”,	is	(I	will	argue)	precisely	
that	these	two	spaces	coincide.		But	once	the	distinction	between	these	two	spaces	in	on	the	table,	it	becomes	clear	that	there	is	no	logical	or	conceptual	reason	why	they	must	coincide	–	and	it	turns	out	(and	this	is	the	main	topic	of	the	present	paper)	that	a	very	simple	way	of	pulling	them	apart	from	one	another	gives	us	
quantum	mechanics.				 What	I	want	to	show	here,	by	means	of	a	few	very	simple	mechanical	examples,	is	(in	a	nutshell)	that	everything	that	has	always	struck	everybody	as	strange	about	quantum	mechanics	can	be	explained	by	supposing	that	the	concrete	fundamental	physical	stuff	of	the	world	is	floating	around	in	something	other,	and	larger,	and	different,	than	the	familiar	3-dimensional	space	of	our	everyday	experience.																																																									1	I’m	thankful	to	Jill	North	(and	of	course,	less	directly,	to	John	Bell)	for	suggesting	this	title.	2	This	could	obviously	do	with	some	qualification.		Aristotle	(for	example)	famously	
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		 Let	me	begin	by	introducing	a	useful	mathematical	device	with	which	some	readers	may	be	unfamiliar.				 Every	classical	physical	system	can	be	uniquely	associated	with	a	formula	called	its	Hamiltonian,	which	expresses	the	total	energy	of	the	system	in	question	–	which	expresses	(that	is)	the	sum	of	the	kinetic	and	the	potential	parts	of	the	energy	of	the	system	in	question	-	as	a	function	of	the	values	of	its	physical	degrees	of	freedom,	and	of	the	values	of	various	of	the	derivatives	if	its	physical	degrees	of	freedom.			 And	it	turns	out	–	and	this	is	why	the	Hamiltonian	is	such	a	useful	device	-	that	the	Hamiltonian	of	a	classical	system	concisely	encodes	everything	there	is	to	
say	about	the	dynamical	laws	of	motion	that	that	system	obeys.		It	turns	out	(that	is)	that	the	way	that	the	total	energy	of	such	a	system	depends	on	its	degrees	of	freedom	–	and	on	various	of	the	derivatives	of	those	degrees	of	freedom	-	uniquely	determines	the	equations	of	the	evolutions	of	the	values	of	those	degrees	of	freedom	in	time.		It	turns	out	(that	is)	that	there	is	a	direct	and	straightforward	and	fully	algorithmic	procedure	for	deriving	those	equations	–	for	any	classical	system	-	from	its	Hamiltonian.	
	 3	
		 To	say	that	the	Hamiltonian	tells	us	everything	about	the	dynamical	laws	of	a	classical	system	(however)	is	not	quite	to	say	that	it	tells	us	exactly	what	kind	of	a	classical	system	it	is	that	we	are	dealing	with.		Consider,	for	example,	a	very	simple	Hamiltonian	–	one	that	consists	exclusively	of	kinetic	energy	terms	-	like:		 H		=		½m(d2x1(t)/dt2)	+	½m(d2x2(t)/dt2)	 	 									(1)		This	Hamiltonian	fixes	the	dynamical	laws	of	a	system	with	2	degrees	of	freedom	–	the	two	xi(t).		But	there	are	two	quite	different	sorts	of	physical	systems	that	a	Hamiltonian	like	this	one	could	very	naturally	be	read	as	describing.		We	could	read	it	(that	is)	as	describing	a	pair	of	particles,	both	of	mass	m,	moving	around,	in	the	absence	of	any	forces,	and	without	interacting	in	any	way	with	one	another,	in	a	one-dimensional	space.		Or	we	could	read	it	as	describing	a	single	particle,	of	mass	m,	moving	around,	in	the	absence	of	any	forces,	in	an	otherwise	empty	two-dimensional	space.		All	that	the	Hamiltonian	does	is	to	determine	the	differential	equations	that	each	of	the	two	xi(t)	need	to	satisfy.		All	that	the	Hamiltonian	does	–	in	this	particular	case	–	is	to	determine	that				 	 	 xi(t)	=	ai	+	vit	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (2)		
	 4	
where	ai	and	vi	are	can	be	any	real	numbers.		And	that’s	precisely	the	sort	of	behavior	that	we	would	intuitively	expect	of	either	one	of	the	two	different	physical	systems	described	above.			 	 	 	 	 	 *		 Good.		Let’s	make	things	a	little	more	complicated.				 Consider	(again)	a	classical	universe	with	two	physical	degrees	of	freedom	–	x1	and	x2	–	but	now	suppose	that	the	values	of	x1	and	x2	evolve	in	time	in	accord	with	the	Hamiltonian			H	=	(1/2m1)(dx1(t)/dt)2	+	(1/2m2)(dx2(t)/dt)2	+	δ(x1-x2).																																						(3)		This	Hamiltonian	differs	from	the	one	in	equation	(1)	in	two	important	ways:	it	includes	a	very	simple	potential-energy	term	-	δ(x1-x2)	–	and	it	allows	for	the	possibility	that	the	values	of	m	in	the	two	kinetic-energy	terms	may	be	different.		Here	are	two	different	ways	of	describing	a	universe	whose	dynamical	laws	are	given	by	a	Hamiltonian	like	the	one	in	equation	(3):			
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A)	The	universe	consists	of	two	point-like	physical	items,	moving	around	in	a	one-dimensional	space,	and	interacting	with	one	another,	on	contact,	by	means	of	elastic	collisions.		B)	The	universe	consists	of	a	single	point-like	physical	item,	moving	around	in	a	two-dimensional	space,	with	an	infinite	potential	barrier	along	it’s	x1	=	x2	diagonal	–	as	in	Figure	1.	
		 	 Figure	1		These	two	descriptions	–	like	the	two	descriptions	we	considered	in	connection	with	the	Hamiltonian	in	equation	(1)	–	are	fully	mathematically	isomorphic	to	one	another.		But	in	this	case,	unlike	in	the	previous	one,	the	two	descriptions	are	not	apt	to	strike	us	as	equally	natural.		Take	almost	anybody,	with	almost	any	kind	of	an	education	in	physics,	and	wake	them	up	in	the	middle	of	the	night,	and	ask	them	to	describe	the	sort	of	world	that	might	have	a	Hamiltonian	like	the	one	in	equation	(3)	
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as	its	fundamental	law	of	motion	–	and	you	are	likely	to	get	something	that’s	much	closer	to	the	language	of	description	(A)	than	it	is	to	the	language	of	description	(B).		And	the	reasons	for	that	will	be	worth	pausing	over,	and	thinking	about.				To	begin	with,	the	mass	associated	with	the	kinetic	energy	of	x-motion	and	the	mass	associated	with	the	kinetic	energy	of	y-motion	–	in	the	example	we	are	considering	here	-	are	different.		And	we	are	used	to	associating	a	single	mass	with	a	single	material	object.		You	might	even	say	that	it	is	part	and	parcel	of	our	very	idea	of	what	it	is	to	be	an	‘ordinary	material	object’	that	every	such	object	is	invariably	associated	with	some	single,	determinate,	value	of	it’s	mass.		And	our	everyday	conception	of	the	world	seems	to	have	something	to	do	with	it’s	being	the	habitation	of	objects	like	that.		And	our	everyday	conception	of	space	seems	to	have	something	to	do	with	the	set	of	points	at	which	an	ordinary	material	object	might	in	principle	be	located,	or	with	the	stage	on	which	such	objects	seem	to	make	their	way	about.			 Good.		But	what	if	the	masses	happen	to	be	the	same?		Won’t	it	be	just	as	natural	(in	that	case)	to	think	of	this	universe	as	consisting	of	a	single	material	particle,	moving	around	in	a	2-dimensional	space,	with	an	infinite	potential	barrier	along	the	diagonal	line	x1=x2?				Well,	no.		There	are	other	issues	here	as	well.		It	seems	to	be	an	important	part	of	our	everyday	conception	of	the	space	in	which	material	particles	make	their	way	
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about	(for	example)	that	it	is	both	homogeneous	and	isotropic.2		It	seems	to	be	an	important	part	of	our	everyday	conception	of	the	space	in	which	material	particles	make	their	way	about	(that	is)	that	it	should	be	just	as	easy,	in	so	far	as	the	fundamental	laws	of	physics	are	concerned,	for	a	material	particle	to	be	in	one	location	as	it	is	for	it	to	be	in	another,	and	that	it	should	be	just	as	easy,	in	so	far	as	the	fundamental	laws	of	physics	are	concerned,	for	a	material	particle	to	be	moving	in	one	direction	as	it	is	for	it	to	be	moving	in	another.		And	the	two-dimensional	picture	of	the	sort	of	world	we	are	considering	here	obviously	features	a	fundamental	law	that	distinguishes	between	points	on	the	diagonal	and	points	off	of	it.		But	if	you	look	at	that	same	law	in	the	context	of	the	one-dimensional	picture	–	if	you	look	(that	is)	at	the	potential	term	in	the	Hamiltonian	in	the	context	of	the	one-dimensional	picture	-	all	it	says	is	that	the	two	particles	can’t	pass	through	one	another.		And	that	way	of	putting	it	obviously	makes	no	distinctions	whatever	between	any	two	points	in	the	one-dimensional	space,	or	among	either	of	its	two	directions.		 Why	couldn’t	we	think	of	the	presence	potential	barrier	in	the	2-dimensional	picture	(then)	not	as	a	matter	of	fundamental	law,	but	(rather)	as	arising	from	the	merely	de	facto	configuration	of	a	field?		Well,	that	would	amount	to	denying	that	the	Hamiltonian	in	equation	(3)	is	in	fact	the	fundamental	Hamiltonian	of	the	universe.																																																										2	This	could	obviously	do	with	some	qualification.		Aristotle	(for	example)	famously	thought	otherwise.		But	there	is	an	intuitive	and	well-known	and	long-standing	classical-mechanical	conception	of	space	that	I	am	gesturing	at	here,	which	I	take	it	is	recognizable	to	everyone,	and	which	(with	a	little	work)	can	be	formulated	in	such	a	way	as	to	apply	to	special	and	general	relativity	as	well.	
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In	that	case	(to	put	it	in	a	slightly	different	way)	the	fundamental	Hamiltonian	of	the	world	is	going	to	be	something	more	elaborate	than	the	one	in	equation	(3),	something	which	offers	a	dynamical	account	not	only	the	evolutions	of	the	co-ordinates	x1	and	x2,	but	the	configurations	of	the	fields	as	well	(something,	that	is,	that	answers	questions	about	how	the	fields	got	there,	and	how	they	evolve,	how	they	are	affected	by	changes	in	the	x1	and	x2	degrees	of	freedom,	and	so	on).		And	that	new	fundamental	theory	is	going	to	bring	with	it	all	sorts	of	new	physical	possibilities,	and	new	counterfactual	relations,	that	were	not	present	in	the	original	2-dimensional	Hamiltonian	that	we	were	dealing	with	above.		So,	what	feels	more	familiar	about	the	first	of	these	descriptions	is	that	it	features	a	space	which	is	homogenous	and	isotropic,	and	which	consists	of	the	sorts	of	points	at	which	ordinary	material	particles	–	particles	(that	is)	which	are	associated	with	unique	and	determinate	quantities	of	mass	–	might	in	principle	be	located.		Let’s	refer	to	spaces	like	that	(then)	as	spaces	of	ordinary	material	bodies.		And	note	(since	it	will	be	important	to	what	follows)	that	what	is	and	isn’t	going	to	count,	for	this	or	that	particular	physical	universe,	as	a	space	of	ordinary	material	bodies,	is	not	a	matter	of	its	fundamental	metaphysical	structure,	but	(rather)	of	its	
dynamical	laws.				 	 	 	 	 	 *		
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Good.		Let’s	make	things	a	little	more	complicated.		Focus	on	the	second	of	the	two	descriptions	–	the	less	familiar	one,	the	2-dimensional	one	-	of	the	simple	universe	that	we	were	talking	about	above.		And	now	consider	a	different	universe,	a	slightly	more	complicated	one,	which	we	obtain	by	introducing	a	second	point-like	physical	item	into	the	two-dimensional	space	–	an	item	which	we	stipulate	to	be	intrinsically	identical	to	the	first,	and	which	floats	around	under	the	governance	of	exactly	the	same	sort	of	Hamiltonian	as	the	one	in	equation	(3)	(see	figure	2).			The	complete	Hamiltonian	of	a	universe	like	that	(then)	is	going	to	be:		H	=	(1/2m1)(dx1(t)/dt)2	+	(1/2m2)(dx2(t)/dt)2	+	(1/2m3)(dx3(t)/dt)2	+	(1/2m4)(dx4(t)/dt)2	+	δ(x1-x2)	+	δ(x3-x4)																																																																												(4)		where	x1	and	x2	are	the	λ	and	μ	co-ordinates	of	item	#1,	and	x3	and	x4	are	the	λ	and	μ	co-ordinates	of	item	#2,	respectively.	
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	 		 	 Figure	2					A	universe	like	this	one	might	be	described	as	consisting	of	four	ordinary	material	particles	–	call	them	particle	1	and	particle	2	and	particle	3	and	particle	4	-	moving	around	(as	before)	in	a	homogenous	and	isotropic	one-dimensional	space.		x1	will	then	represent	the	one-dimensional	position	of	particle	1,	and	x2	will	represent	the	one-dimensional	position	of	particle	2,	and	so	on.		But	the	way	those	particles	move	around	is	now	going	to	be	kind	of	funny.		Suppose	(just	to	keep	things	simple	for	the	moment)	that	m1	=	m3	and	m2	=	m4.		Then	particles	1	and	3	are	going	to	be	qualitatively	identical	to	one	another,	and	particles	2	and	4	are	going	to	be	qualitatively	identical	to	one	another,	and	yet	the	way	that	particle	1	interacts	
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with	particle	2	is	going	to	be	different	from	the	way	that	particle	3	interacts	with	particle	2,	and	the	way	that	particle	2	interacts	with	particle	1	is	going	to	be	different	from	the	way	that	particle	4	interacts	with	particle	1	(particle	1,	for	example,	is	going	to	bounce	off	of	particle	2,	but	it	will	pass	right	through	particle	4	–	and	particle	4	is	going	to	bounce	off	of	particle	3,	but	it	will	pass	right	through	particle	1).		And	so,	unlike	in	the	two-particle	case	we	considered	before,	a	qualitative	description	of	the	physical	situation	of	this	world,	at	some	particular	time,	in	the	one-dimensional	space	(that	is:	a	complete	specification	of	which	four	points	in	this	one-dimensional	space	are	occupied	by	particles,	together	with	a	specification	of	the	velocities	of	the	particles	at	each	of	those	points,	together	with	a	specification	of	the	intrinsic	properties	of	the	particles	at	each	of	those	points)	is	not	going	to	give	us	enough	information	to	predict,	even	in	principle,	the	qualitative	situation	of	this	world	at	other	times.3																																																									3	The	first	thing	that’s	likely	to	pop	into	one’s	head,	on	being	confronted	with	this,	is	that	particle	1	must	not	(in	fact)	be	qualitatively	identical	to	particle	3,	and	(similarly)	that	particle	2	must	not	be	qualitatively	identical	to	particle	4.		Let’s	think	about	how	that	might	work.		Suppose	that	particle	1	were	not	qualitatively	identical	with	particle	3.		Then	there	would	have	be	some	pair	of	physical	properties	P	and	Q	such	one	of	them	is	P	and	the	other	is	Q.		And	if	particle	2	were	not	qualitatively	identical	to	particle	4,	then	there	would	have	to	be	some	pair	of	properties	R	and	S	(which	might	or	might	not	be	different	properties	from	the	properties	P	and	Q)	such	one	of	them	x’s	is	R	and	the	other	is	S.		And	with	these	new	properties	in	hand,	one	could	of	course	write	down	a	law	–	which	would	account	for	the	motions	of	these	particles	-	to	the	effect	that	(say)	particles	that	are	P	only	bounce	off	of	particles	that	are	R,	and	that	particles	that	are	Q	only	bounce	off	of	particles	that	are	S.		Or	something	like	that.		But	nothing	like	that	can	be	right.		What	we	are	supposed	to	be	imagining	here	(remember)	is	a	universe	that	consists	of	two	intrinsically	identical	point-like	physical	items,	floating	around	in	a	two-dimensional	space,	in	accord	with	the	Hamiltonian	in	equation	(4).		What	we	are	supposed	to	be	imagining	(to	put	it	slightly	differently)	is	that	a	specification	of	the	locations	of	those	two	intrinsically	identical	point-like	physical	items	in	the	two-dimensional	space,	at	any	particular	time,	amounts	to	a	complete	qualitative	description	of	the	world	at	the	time	in	
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	Maybe	the	thing	to	say	(then)	is	that	the	sort	of	world	that	we	are	imagining	here	is	just	not	thoroughly	lawful	–	maybe	the	thing	to	say	(that	is)	is	that	there	is	simply	not	any	fully	general	rule	about	how	the	complete	physical	conditions	of	a	universe	like	this	one	at	different	times	are	related	to	one	another.		But	that’s	obviously	not	right	either.		If	we	look	back	at	the	two-dimensional	representation	of	this	particular	universe	(after	all)	then	everything	immediately	snaps	into	place:	a	complete	specification	of	the	qualitative	situation,	at	any	particular	instant,	in	the	two-dimensional	space	(that	is)	is	going	to	give	us	enough	information	to	predict,	in																																																																																																																																																																						question	–	a	description	(that	is)	on	which	all	of	the	other	qualitative	features	of	the	world,	at	that	instant,	supervene.			But	if	there	are	P’s	and	Q’s	and	R’s	and	S’s	of	the	sort	that	we	have	just	now	been	imagining	–	then	(as	the	reader	can	easily	confirm	for	herself)	there	are	going	to	be	two	qualitatively	different	situations	in	the	one-dimensional	space	corresponding	to	every	pair	of	locations	in	the	two-dimensional	space	–	and	so	a	specification	of	the	locations	of	the	two	intrinsically	identical	point-like	physical	items	in	the	two-dimensional	space	would	not	amount	to	a	complete	qualitative	description	of	the	world	after	all.		And	so	–	in	the	sort	of	world	that	we	are	imagining	here,	and	if	we	are	going	to	be	in	the	business	of	attributing	any	physical	properties	at	all	to	the	particles	that	are	moving	around	in	the	one-dimensional	space	–	particle	1	must	be	intrinsically	identical	to	particle	3,	and	particle	2	must	be	intrinsically	identical	to	particle	4.		And	even	if	we	set	aside	the	idea	that	these	four	material	particles	are	“shadows”	of	something	else	moving	around	in	a	higher-dimensional	space	–	even	(that	is)	if	we	imagine	a	universe	that	consists	of	nothing	whatever	over	and	above	those	four	material	particles,	moving	around	in	a	one-dimensional	space,	as	if	they	were	shadows	of	two	identical	point-like	physical	items	moving	around,	in	a	two-dimensional	space	in	accord	with	the	Hamiltonian	in	equation	(4)	–	it	would	still	make	no	sense	to	imagine	that	particle	1	is	somehow	intrinsically	different	from	particle	3,	and	that	particle	2	is	somehow	intrinsically	different	from	particle	4,	because	it	follows	from	the	qualitative	identity	of	the	two	(imaginary)	point-like	physical	items	in	the	(imaginary)	two-dimensional	space	that	particle	1	is	going	to	respond	to	any	externally	imposed	force-field	in	exactly	the	way	that	particle	3	does,	and	that	particle	2	is	going	to	respond	to	any	externally	imposed	force-field	in	exactly	the	way	that	particle	4	does.			
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principle,	how	that	situation	is	going	to	evolve	into	the	future.		And	from	that	(of	course)	we	are	going	to	be	able	to	read	off	all	of	the	future	qualitative	situations	in	the	one-dimensional	space	as	well.		In	the	case	we	considered	before,	the	one-dimensional	representation	of	the	universe	and	the	two-dimensional	representation	of	the	universe	were	straightforwardly	isomorphic	to	one	another.		In	the	case	we	considered	before	(that	is)	there	was	exactly	one	possible	state	of	the	point-like	item	floating	around	in	the	
two-dimensional	space	corresponding	to	every	individual	one	of	the	possible	states	of	the	two	material	particles	floating	around	in	the	one-dimensional	space.		But	here	(as	I	mentioned	above)	there	are	two	qualitatively	different	states	of	the	two	point-like	physical	items	floating	around	in	the	two-dimensional	space	corresponding	to	every	individual	qualitative	state	the	four	material	particles	floating	around	in	the	
one-dimensional	space.		And	so	the	history	of	the	universe	we	are	dealing	with	here	–	the	history	(that	is)	of	this	particular	pair	of	point-like	physical	items	floating	around	in	this	particular	two-dimensional	space	-	can	simply	not	be	presented	in	the	form	of	a	history	of	the	motions	of	familiar	material	bodies,	and	the	dynamical	laws	of	a	universe	like	the	one	we	are	dealing	with	here	can	simply	not	be	written	down	in	the	form	of	laws	of	the	motions	of	everyday	material	bodies.		In	the	case	we	considered	before	(to	put	it	slightly	differently)	the	basic	physical	stuff	of	the	world	–	the	stuff	on	whose	history	the	history	of	everything	else	supervenes,	the	stuff	to	which	the	fundamental	dynamical	laws	apply	-	was	the	stuff	of	the	material	particles.		But	it	seems	like	the	right	thing	to	say	about	a	universe	like	this	one	is	that	the	basic	
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physical	stuff	is	the	stuff	of	the	two	point-like	items	in	the	two-dimensional	space	–	and	that	the	reason	that	everything	looks	so	odd	as	viewed	from	the	perspective	of	the	one-dimensional	space	is	that	the	one-dimensional	space	isn’t	where	things	are	
really	going	on,	and	that	the	material	particles	that	move	around	in	that	space	are	really	just	“shadows”	(as	it	were)	of	the	actual,	fundamental,	physical	items.			So	there	are	going	to	be	two	sorts	of	space	that	are	worth	talking	about	in	a	universe	like	this	one.		There	is,	to	begin	with,	the	one-dimensional	habitation	of	ordinary	material	bodies.		And	then	there’s	the	space	in	which	one	can	represent	everything	that’s	going	on,	in	which	one	can	keep	track	of	everything	that’s	going	on,	merely	by	saying	what	it	is	that’s	going	on	at	every	individual	one	of	its	points	-	the	space	(you	might	say)	of	the	totality	of	atomic	opportunities	for	things,	at	any	
particular	temporal	instant,	to	be	one	way	or	another.		Call	that	“the	space	of	the	elementary	physical	determinables”.		And	what	we	have	just	seen	is	that	the	space	of	the	elementary	physical	determinables,	in	a	world	like	the	one	we	are	dealing	with	here,	has	two	dimensions.		The	space	of	ordinary	material	bodies	and	the	space	of	elementary	physical	determinables	turn	out	to	be	very	different	kinds	of	things.		It	is	part	and	parcel	of	our	idea	of	the	space	of	ordinary	material	bodies	(for	example)	that	all	of	the	points	in	it	are	going	to	be	intrinsically	identical	to	one	another	–	but	the	above	example	makes	it	clear	that	we	should	have	no	such	expectations,	as	a	general	matter,	about	the	space	of	elementary	physical	dererminables.		The	space	of	ordinary	material	
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things	is	the	set	of	points	at	which	you	could	imagine,	in	principle,	placing	the	tip	of	your	finger.		But	the	items	that	move	around	in	the	space	of	the	elementary	physical	determinables,	at	least	in	the	case	of	the	sort	of	universe	we	are	considering	now,	are	not	material	bodies	at	all.		But	(notwithstanding	all	that)	the	space	of	the	elementary	physical	determinables	is	clearly	the	more	fundamental	of	the	two.		The	situation	in	the	space	of	ordinary	material	bodies	(once	again)	supervenes,	by	definition,	on	the	situation	in	the	space	of	the	elementary	physical	determinables	–	but	the	reverse	is	of	course	not	true	–	or	not	(at	any	rate)	in	the	sort	of	world	we	are	thinking	of	here.		So	the	sorts	of	distinctions	that	one	can	make	in	the	language	of	the	space	of	the	elementary	physical	determinables	are	more	fine-grained	than	the	sorts	of	distinctions	one	can	make	in	the	language	of	the	space	of	ordinary	material	bodies.		Moreover,	the	space	of	the	elementary	physical	determinables	is	what	fixes	the	
elementary	kinematical	possibilities	of	the	world	–	and	so	it	is	(in	that	sense)	something	logically	prior	to	the	laws	of	dynamics,	it’s	something	like	the	arena	within	which	those	laws	act.		But	the	space	of	ordinary	material	things	(as	I	mentioned	before)	is	something	whose	topology	and	whose	geometry	and	whose	very	existence	all	explicitly	depend	on	what	the	fundamental	dynamical	laws	actually	happen	to	be	–	it’s	something	that	the	dynamics	can	be	thought	of	as	producing,	something	which	is	(in	that	sense)	emergent.				
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There	are	other	differences	too	–	there	is	an	interesting	question	(for	example)	about	whether	the	space	of	the	elementary	physical	determinables	needs	to	be	thought	of	as	having	any	geometry	at	all	–	but	a	discussion	of	those	would	take	us	too	far	afield	at	the	moment.4		 The	image	of	‘space’	that	all	of	us	grew	up	with	(then)	turns	out	to	be	a	crude	and	undifferentiated	amalgam	of	both	a	space	of	ordinary	material	bodies	and	a	space	of	elementary	physical	determinables.		That	physics	should	never	heretofore	have	taken	note	of	the	distinction	between	these	two	sorts	of	spaces	is	entirely	unsurprising	–	because	they	happen	to	be	identical	with	one	another	(just	as	they	were	in	the	two-particle,	one-dimensional	example	we	considered	above)	in	Newtonian	Mechanics,	and	in	Maxwellian	Electrodynamics,	and	in	the	physics	of	everyday	macroscopic	practical	life.		The	manifest	image	of	the	world	(you	might	say)	includes	both	a	space	of	ordinary	material	things	and	a	space	of	the	elementary	physical	determinables	-	together	with	the	stipulation	that	they	are,	in	fact,	exactly	
the	same	thing.		And	classical	physics	never	gave	us	any	reason	to	imagine	otherwise.		But	(notwithstanding	all	that)	these	two	ideas	would	seem	to	be	worth	carefully	prying	apart.		They	have	nothing	logically	to	do	with	one	another,	and	it	is	the	easiest	thing	in	the	world	(as	we	have	just	seen)	to	imagine	universes,	and	to	write	down	Hamiltonians,	in	which	(for	example)	they	have	different	numbers	of	dimensions.																																																										4	These	issues	of	the	origin	and	significance	of	distance	are	the	focus	of	a	recent	unpublished	manuscript	of	mine	called	“On	the	Emergence	of	Space	and	Time”.	
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Ok.		Let’s	get	back,	with	all	this	in	mind,	to	the	particular	system	we	were	thinking	about	before	–	the	one	described	by	the	Hamiltonian	in	equation	(4).		One	of	the	effects	of	introducing	a	second	point-like	physical	item	into	the	two-dimensional	space	is	(as	we	have	seen)	to	pry	apart	the	space	of	ordinary	material	bodies	and	the	space	of	elementary	physical	detirminables	–	to	make	them	(in	particular)	into	two	distinct	and	topologically	different	spaces.		And	one	of	the	effects	of	this	coming-apart	is	that	the	goings-on	in	the	space	of	ordinary	material	bodies	–	or	(rather)	that	the	goings-on	in	the	physical	universe,	as	viewed	from	the	
perspective	of	the	space	of	ordinary	material	bodies	–	begins	to	look	odd.		Particles	1	and	2	bounce	off	one	another,	and	particles	3	and	4	bounce	off	one	another,	but	(even	though	particle	1	is	intrinsically	identical	to	particle	3	and	particle	2	is	intrinsically	identical	to	particle	4)	the	particles	1	and	2	move	around	as	if	particles	3	and	4	simply	did	not	exist,	and	particles	3	and	4	move	around	as	if	particles	1	and	2	simply	did	not	exist.		And	so	what	we	are	presented	with,	in	the	space	of	the	ordinary	material	bodies	of	a	universe	like	this	one,	is	less	like	a	collection	of	four	particles	floating	around	in	a	one-dimensional	space,	than	it	is	(say)	like	a	pair	of	causally	unconnected	parallel	worlds,	in	each	of	which	there	is	a	pair	of	particles	is	floating	around	in	a	one-dimensional	space,	or	like	a	pair	of	different	possibilities,	or	like	a	pair	of	different	scenarios,	about	how	one	and	the	
same	pair	particles	might	be	floating	around	in	a	one-dimensional	space,	or	something	like	that.		Whatever	is	true	in	both	of	the	scenarios	is	apparently	true	
simpliciter	–	so	that	(for	example)	if	x1	and	x3	both	happen	to	be	equal	to	5,	then	the	
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first	particle	(the	one	whose	mass	is	m1	=	m3)	is	unambiguously	located	at	point	5	in	the	one-dimensional	space	of	ordinary	material	bodies	–	but	it’s	harder	to	know	exactly	what	to	say	about	facts	on	which	they	differ.		If	we	were	adamant	about	representing	a	universe	like	this	to	ourselves	in	its	one-dimensional	space	of	ordinary	material	bodies,	we	might	do	so	with	the	help	of	an	additional	piece	of	notation	–	a	pair	of	brackets	(say),	one	of	which	links	particle	1	with	particle	2,	and	the	other	of	which	links	particle	3	with	particle	4	-	as	in	figure	3	–	to	indicate	which	particles	share	these	‘scenarios’	with	one	another	and	which	don’t.
		 	 	 Figure	3		From	the	point	of	view	of	the	two-dimensional	space	of	elementary	physical	
determinables,	the	brackets	are	just	a	way	of	keeping	track	of	the	connections	between	the	four	ordinary	material	particles	in	the	one-dimensional	space	and	the	two	point-like	physical	items	in	the	two-dimensional	space.		But	if	we	are	resolute	in	banishing	any	thought	of	that	latter	space	from	our	minds,	then	we	are	apparently	
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going	to	need	to	think	of	the	brackets	as	signifying	some	real	and	radically	unfamiliar	and	not-further-analyzable	physical	connection	between	pairs	of	material	particles	themselves	–	something	that	can	not	be	reduced	to,	something	that	does	not	supervene	on,	the	spatial	distribution	of	local	physical	properties.				 	 	 	 	 	 *		Ok.		Let’s	complicate	things	still	more.		Suppose	that	we	were	to	add	a	term	of	the	form	δ(x1-x2)δ(x3-x4)	to	the	Hamiltonian	in	equation	(4),	so	that	it	looks	like	this:		H	=	(1/2m1)(dx1(t)/dt)2	+	(1/2m2)(dx2(t)/dt)2	+	(1/2m3)(dx3(t)/dt)2	+	(1/2m4)(x4(t)/dt)2	+	δ(x1-x2)	+	δ(x3-x4)	+	δ(x1-x3)δ(x2-x4)																											(5)		That	would	amount	to	adding	a	new	and	funny	kind	of	an	interaction	-	an	interaction	not	between	two	of	the	particles	floating	around	in	the	material	space,	but	(rather)	between	the	two	point-like	items	floating	around	in	the	determinable	space	–	an	interaction	(that	is)	between	what	might	previously	have	looked	to	us,	from	the	perspective	of	the	material	space,	like	two	different	possibilities,	or	two	different	scenarios,	or	two	distinct	and	parallel	worlds.		Note	(to	begin	with)	that	this	new	term	is	still	going	to	preserve	the	invariance	of	the	Hamiltonian	under	translations	in	the	one-dimensional	space	–	and	so	the	
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material	space	of	this	new	world,	the	space	in	which	all	points	are	intrinsically	identical,	the	space	in	which	particles	have	unique	determinate	masses,	is	still	going	to	be	one-dimensional.		But	the	behaviors	of	these	particles,	as	viewed	from	the	one-dimensional	space	in	which	they	live,	are	getting	odder	and	odder.		The	effect	of	adding	this	new	interaction	is	going	to	be	quantitatively	small	–	because	collisions	between	the	two	point-like	items	in	the	determinable	space	are	going	to	be	much	much	rarer	than	collisions	between	either	one	of	them	and	the	fixed	diagonal	potential	barrier	-	but	it	is	nonetheless	going	to	be	conceptually	profound.		From	the	perspective	of	the	material	space	things	are	still	going	to	look	more	or	less	as	if	there	are	two	pairs	of	particles	floating	around	in	two	parallel	possible	situations	–	linked	together	by	their	mysterious	brackets.		But	a	more	detailed	examination	is	now	going	to	reveal	that	this	picture	of	parallel	possible	situations	does	not	quite	hold	up	–	because	the	evolutions	of	these	two	possibilities	can	sometimes,	in	fact,	interfere	with	one	another.			Moreover,	the	effects	of	this	new	interaction,	as	viewed	from	the	perspective	of	the	space	of	ordinary	material	bodies,	are	going	to	be	bizarrely	non-local.		Particles	x1	and	x2	are	going	to	collide	with	one	another	(that	is:	particles	1	and	3	are	going	to	
interact	with	one	another,	particles	1	and	3	are	suddenly	going	to	become	visible	to	one	another,	particles	1	and	3	are	suddenly	going	to	be	unable	to	pass	through	one	another)	only	in	the	event	that	particles	2	and	4	happen	to	be	colliding	with	one	another,	somewhere	in	the	material	space,	anywhere	in	the	material	space,	at	exactly	
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the	same	temporal	instant.		And	vise	versa.		And	the	mechanism	whereby	those	two	collisions	make	one	another	possible	does	not	depend	on	any	way	whatever	on	the	one-dimensional	physical	distance	between	them	–	it	only	depends	on	their	primitive	and	unanalyzable	and	now	even	more	mysterious	bracket-connections.		And	all	of	this	should	by	now	have	begun	to	remind	you	of	quantum	mechanics.		But	the	business	of	saying	exactly	how	it	should	remind	you	of	quantum	mechanics	–	the	business	of	saying	exactly	what	should	remind	you	of	what	-	requires	close	attention.		The	thing	that	needs	to	be	kept	in	mind,	the	thing	that	people	seem	to	have	trouble	taking	in	when	all	of	this	is	first	presented	to	them,	is	that	introducing	another	point-like	concrete	fundamental	physical	item	to	the	2-dimensional	space	is	
not	at	all	like	introducing	another	particle	to	the	1-dimensional	space,	or	like	introducing	another	pair	of	particles	to	the	1-dimensional	space,	or	like	introducing	a	second	Bohmian	Marvelous	Point	into	the	contents	of	the	sort	of	universe	that	we	have	been	thinking	about	here	-	but	(rather)	like	adding	another	term,	like	adding	another	branch,	to	the	quantum-mechanical	wave-function	of	the	single,	original,	
two-particle	system	in	the	1-dimensional	space.		Consider,	for	example,	a	pair	of	quantum-mechanical	particles,	one	of	which	(particle	1)	has	only	position-space	degrees	of	freedom,	and	the	other	of	which	(particle	2)	has	both	spin	and	position-space	degrees	of	freedom.		And	suppose	that	the	quantum	state	of	that	pair	of	particles,	at	a	certain	time,	is:					(1/√2)[x=α>1[x=γ,	éz>2	+	(1/√2)[x=β>1[x=γ,	êz>2																																	(6)	
	 22	
	And	note	that	if	α	≠	β	(which	is	to	say:	if	the	two	versions	of	particle	1	do	not	happen	to	be	located	at	the	same	point	in	space)	then	the	reduced	density	matrix	of	particle	2	is	going	to	be	an	incoherent	mixture	of	spin-states	–	but	if	α	=	β	(which	is	to	say:	if	the	two	versions	of	particle	1	do	happen	to	be	located	at	the	same	point	in	space)	
then	the	two	spin-states	of	particle	2	are	going	to	interfere	with	one	another,	in	such	a	way	as	to	produce	an	eigenstate	of	x-spin.		And	note	(as	well)	that	none	of	this	depends	in	any	way	on	how	far	apart	in	space	α	(or	β)	and	γ	may	happen	to	be,	or	what	may	happen	to	be	going	on	in	the	space	between	them.5				 	 	 	 	 	 *		Let’s	go	one	step	further.		This	one	(however)	will	take	a	bit	of	setting	up.			To	begin	with,	replace	the	very	sharply	peaked	potential	barrier	along	the	diagonal	in	the	two-dimensional	space	with	a	more	smoothly	varying	potential	well	along	the	diagonal	in	the	two-dimensional	space.		That	is:	replace	the	δ(x1-x2)	+	δ(x3-x4)	in	(4)	with	V(|x1-x2|)	+	V(|x3-x4|),	where	V(|r|)	is	some	smoothly	varying	and	monotonically	increasing	function	of	|r|	which,	and	which	is	negative	for	all	finite																																																									5	The	reader	might	like	to	consider	why	it	is	that	the	kind	of	quantum-mechanical	non-locality	on	display	in	this	example	cannot	be	exploited,	as	a	matter	of	fundamental	principle,	for	the	superluminal	transmission	of	information.		There	is,	of	course,	a	famous	argument,	due	to	Von	Neumann,	to	the	effect	that	the	non-localities	associated	with	the	collapse	of	the	wave-function,	or	with	the	effective	collapse	of	the	wave-function,	cannot	be	exploited	for	the	superluminal	transmission	of	information	–	but	there	are	no	collapses	here,	and	the	sort	of	argument	one	needs	in	a	case	like	this	turns	out	to	be	somewhat	different.		
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values	of	|r|,	and	which	asymptotically	approaches	zero	as	|r|	approaches	infinity.			This	amounts	to	replacing	the	sharp	contact	repulsive	force	between	particles	1	and	2	and	particles	3	and	4	in	the	one-dimensional	space	with	a	force	that	attracts	1	
towards	2	and	3	towards	4,	and	which	acts	across	finite	distances	(like	Newtonian	gravitation,	say)	in	the	one-dimensional	space.		And	let’s	stipulate,	as	well,	that	this	attractive	force	can	be	switched	on	and	off	as	we	wish.		The	Hamiltonian	we’re	dealing	with	now	(then)	is			H	=	(1/2m1)(dx1(t)/dt)2	+	(1/2m2)(dx2(t)/dt)2	+	(1/2m3)(dx3(t)/dt)2	+	(1/2m4)(x4(t)/dt)2	+	g(t)(V(|x1-x2|)	+	V(|x3-x4|))	+	δ(x1-x3)δ(x2-x4)																				(7)		where	the	g(t)	is	there	simply	to	remind	us	that	we	are	allowed	to	switch	that	part	of	the	potential	energy	on	and	off	at	our	discretion.			And	note	(yet	again)	that	none	of	these	changes	are	going	to	alter	the	fact	that	the	material	space	of	a	system	like	this	is	the	one-dimensional	space,	and	that	it’s	
determinable	space	is	the	two-dimensional	one.		Good.		Now	suppose	(for	reasons	that	will	presently	become	clear)	that	particles	1	and	3	are	much	more	massive	than	particles	2	and	4.		And	set	things	up	as	follows:		The	attractive	force	is	off,	and	particles	2	and	4	are	at	rest	at	the	origin,	and	particle	1	is	at	the	point	+1	and	particle	3	is	at	the	point	-1,	as	depicted	in	figure	4.		
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	 	 	 Figure	4					The	corresponding	arrangement	in	the	two-dimensional	space,	which	is	depicted	in	figure	5,	has	one	of	the	point-like	physical	items	-	item	number	1	–	at	the	point	(λ=+1,	μ=0)	and	the	other	–	item	number	2	–	at	(λ=-1,	μ=0).		The	small	arrows	in	figures	4	and	5	indicate	the	directions	in	which	the	two	particles	(in	the	case	of	figure	4)	and	the	two	point-like	items	(in	the	case	of	figure	5)	will	begin	to	move	once	the	attractive	potential	is	switched	on.	
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				 	 	 Figure	5		Since	particles	2	and	4	are	touching	one	another	here,	particles	1	and	3	are	going	
bounce	off	one	another	if	they	should	happen	to	meet.		So	particles	1	and	3,	in	this	situation,	do	not	relate	to	one	another	much	like	components	of	two	distinct	
possibilities,	or	of	two	parallel	worlds.		Indeed	–	and	on	the	contrary	-	what	we	are	dealing	with	here	(so	long	as	the	y-particles	remain	at	rest,	and	touching	one	another,	and	so	long	as	the	attractive	forces	are	switched	off)	is	just	the	familiar	case	of	two	particles	(the	x-particles)	moving	around	in	a	one-dimensional	space,	and	interacting	with	one	another	by	means	of	a	repulsive	contact	interaction	–	precisely	the	case	(that	is)	that	we	started	off	with.			
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And	now	suppose	that	we	switch	the	attractive	forces	on.		At	this	point	we	will	have	moved	things	into	a	regime	in	which	both	of	the	dimensions	of	the	determinable	space	associated	with	the	Hamiltonian	in	(7)	come	decisively	into	play.		And	one	way	to	think	about	what’s	going	on	here	is	that	we	have	switched	on	a	pair	of	measuring-devices	for	the	positions	of	particles	1	and	3	–	devices	whose	
pointers	are	particles	2	and	4.		When	the	attractive	forces	are	switched	on,	each	of	the	y-particles	starts	to	move	in	the	direction	of	it’s	corresponding	x-particle	–	each	of	the	y-particles	indicates	(you	might	say)	the	direction	in	which	it’s	corresponding	x-particle	is	located	–	and	it	was	precisely	in	order	to	build	the	appropriate	sort	of	asymmetry	into	this	indicator-indicated	relationship	that	we	stipulated,	a	few	paragraphs	back,	that	the	masses	of	particles	1	and	3	be	much	larger	than	the	masses	of	particles	2	and	4.		And	note	(and	this	is	the	punch	line)	that	as	soon	as	these	measurements	take	place,	and	for	as	long	as	their	different	outcomes	are	preserved	in	differences	between	the	positions	of	particles	2	and	4,	the	whole	metaphysical	character	of	the	situation	–	at	least	as	viewed	from	the	1-dimensional	material	space	-	appears	to	radically	shift.		Any	possibility	of	interaction	between	particles	1	and	3	is	now	abolished,	and	the	system	behaves,	again,	for	all	the	world,	as	if	it	were	a	pair	of	mutually	exclusive	scenarios,	or	of	parallel	universes,	in	one	of	which	a	light	particle	detects	a	heavy	particle	at	position	+1,	and	in	the	other	of	which	the	same	light	particle	detects	the	same	heavy	particle,	instead,	at	position	-1.		And	anyone	familiar	with	(say)	the	many-worlds	interpretation	of	quantum	mechanics,	or	with	the	de-
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coherent	histories	interpretation	of	quantum	mechanics,	is	going	to	recognize	that	what	we	have	stumbled	across	here	is	precisely	the	annihilation	of	the	off-diagonal	
interference	terms,	in	the	reduced	density	matrix	of	a	measured	system,	by	the	interaction	with	a	measuring-device	-	and	anyone	familiar	with	Bohmian	Mechanics	is	going	to	recognize	that	what	we	have	stumbled	across	here	is	precisely	the	phenomenon	that	is	responsible	for	the	so-called	effective	collapse	of	the	wave-function.				There	is,	of	course,	as	yet,	no	unique	determinate	fact	of	the	matter	about	the	
outcome	of	the	sort	of	measurement	described	above.		What	we	are	left	with	–	once	the	attractive	potential	is	switched	off	-	is	(again)	something	like	a	pair	of	parallel	universes,	in	one	of	which	a	light	particle	has	detected	a	heavy	particle	at	position	+1,	and	in	the	other	of	which	the	same	light	particle	has	detected	the	same	heavy	particle,	instead,	at	position	-1.		And	the	business	of	arranging	for	one	or	the	other	of	those	universes	to	somehow	amount	to	the	actual	one	is	just	the	familiar	business	of	solving	the	quantum-mechanical	problem	of	measurement:		You	either	find	a	way	of	making	one	or	the	other	of	those	universes	disappear	(that’s	the	sort	of	thing	that	happens	in	theories	of	the	“collapse	of	the	wave-function”)	or	you	find	a	way	of	endowing	one	or	the	other	of	those	universes	with	some	sort	of	special	status	(as	one	does,	for	example,	in	Bohmain	Mechanics).		But	we	are	getting	ahead	of	ourselves.		Put	the	measurement	problem	to	one	side	for	the	moment	–	we’ll	come	back	to	it	later.		
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	 	 	 	 	 	 *		We	can	edge	still	closer	to	the	familiar	quantum-mechanical	formalism	by	replacing	the	point-like	physical	items	in	the	space	of	elementary	physical	determinables	by	something	more	like	fields.		In	the	examples	we	considered	above,	in	which	different	possible	situations	in	the	space	of	ordinary	material	bodies	corresponded	to	different	concrete	point-like	physical	items	floating	around	in	the	space	of	elementary	physical	detirminables,	the	business	of	arranging	for	the	possibility	of	interference	between	different	such	situations	had	to	do	with	the	introduction	of	new	terms	into	the	fundamental	Hamiltonian	of	the	world	–	terms	(for	example)	like	the	δ(x1-x3)δ(x2-x4)	in	equations	(5)	and	(7)	-	whereby	the	different	point-like	physical	items	can	literally	push	or	pull	on	one	another.		But	fields	can	do	something	else	to	one	another,	something	that	has	nothing	to	do	with	pushing	or	pulling,	something	that	doesn’t	depend	on	the	introduction	of	any	additional	terms	into	the	Hamiltonian:	they	can	add	to	or	subtract	from	one	another	-	they	can	interfere	(that	is)	in	the	way	that	water	waves	do.		So	if	what	we	think	of	as	inhabiting	the	space	of	elementary	physical	detirminables	are	something	like	fields,	then	something	like	a	principle	of	superposition	–	then	(that	is)	the	possibility	of	various	different	possible	situations	in	the	space	of	ordinary	material	bodies	actually	physically	interfering	with	one	another	-	is	going	to	be	built	right	into	the	fundamental	kinematics	of	the	world,	just	as	it	is	in	quantum	mechanics,	and	it’s	not	going	to	require	any	specialized	additions	to	the	laws	of	dynamics.		
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Here’s	a	very	simple	example.				Go	back	to	case	of	a	single	point-like	physical	item,	floating	around	in	a	two-dimensional	space,	with	a	diagonal	potential	barrier.		And	imagine	that	we	replace	that	item	with	a	scalar	field	–	a	field	which	always	has	the	value	+1	at	exactly	one	of	the	points	in	the	2-dimensional	space,	and	which	always	has	the	value	zero	everywhere	else.		And	suppose	that	the	point	at	which	the	field	has	the	value	+1	moves	around	in	the	2-dimensional	space	–	just	as	the	point-like	physical	system	did	in	the	earlier	example	–	in	accord	with	the	Hamiltonian	in	equation	(3).		It	will	be	natural	–	just	as	it	was	in	the	case	of	the	single	point-like	item	floating	around	in	a	2-dimensional	space,	and	for	exactly	the	same	reasons	as	it	was	in	the	case	of	the	single	point-like	item	floating	around	in	the	2-simensional	space	–	to	describe	a	world	like	this	as	consisting	of	a	pair	of	ordinary	material	particles,	of	different	masses,	floating	around	in	a	homogenous	and	isotropic	1-dimensional	space.				Suppose	now	that	there	are	two	points	in	the	2-dimensional	space	at	which	the	field	is	non-zero,	and	suppose	(just	to	make	things	interesting)	that	the	field	has	the	value	+1	at	one	of	those	points	and	that	it	has	the	value	-1	at	the	other,	and	suppose	that	the	two	points	in	question	move	around	the	2-dimensional	space	in	accord	with	the	Hamiltonian	in	equation	(4).		A	universe	like	this	one	can	be	described	(as	before)	as	consisting	of	four	ordinary	material	particles,	moving	around	in	a	
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homogenous	and	isotropic	one-dimensional	space.		But	the	way	those	particles	move	is	(again)	going	to	be	kind	of	funny.		If	m1	=	m3,	and	if	m2	=	m4,	and	if	we	assume	that	signs	of	the	fields	in	the	2-dimensional	space	can	make	no	difference	to	the	intrinsic	properties	of	their	one-dimensional	shadows,	then	particle	1	and	particle	3	are	going	to	be	intrinsically	identical	to	one	another	-	and	yet	particle	1	is	going	to	elastically	collide	with	particle	2,	whereas	particle	3	is	going	to	pass	right	
trough	particle	2,	and	so	on.		And	so	(again)	a	qualitative	description	of	the	physical	situation	at	some	particular	time,	in	the	one-dimensional	space,	is	not	going	to	give	us	enough	information	to	predict,	even	in	principle,	the	qualitative	situation	of	this	world	at	other	times.		And	so	the	2-dimensional	space	of	elementary	physical	detirminables	turns	out	(again)	to	be	more	fundamental	–	in	all	of	the	ways	that	we	have	already	discussed	–	than	the	one-dimensional	space	of	ordinary	material	bodies.		And	so	(again)	this	turns	out	to	be	less	like	a	collection	of	four	particles	floating	around	in	a	one-dimensional	physical	space	than	it	is	like	two	different	
possibilities	about	how	two	such	particles	might	be	floating	around	in	a	one-dimensional	space,	or	like	two	causally	unconnected	parallel	worlds,	in	each	of	which	a	pair	of	particles	is	floating	around	in	a	one-dimensional	space,	or	something	like	that.				Except	that	here	–	even	in	the	absence	of	any	further	modification	of	the	fundamental	laws	of	motion	which	is	designed	to	allow	these	two	possibilities	to	
dynamically	interact	with	one	another,	even	in	the	absence	(that	is)	of	an	additional	term	in	the	Hamiltonian	like	the	δ(x1-x3)δ(x2-x4)	of	equations	(5)	and	(7)	–	they	can	
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nevertheless,	now	and	then,	and	in	an	altogether	different	and	purely	kinematical	way,	interfere	with	one	another.		Note	(for	example)	that	if	the	two	field-points	in	the	two-dimensional	space	of	elementary	physical	detirminables	should	ever	happen	to	cross	paths,	their	two	fields	will	cancel	one	another.		And	what	that	means	is	that	if	(for	example)	the	positions	of	particles	2	and	4	in	the	one-dimensional	space	of	ordinary	material	bodies	should	ever	happen	to	coincide,	and	if	(while	the	positions	of	2	and	4	coincide)	particles	1	and	3	should	ever	happen	to	come	together,	then,	no	matter	how	far	apart	particles	1	and	3	may	happen	to	be	from	particles	2	and	4,	all	four	of	the	particles	are	going	to	disappear!		This	is	not	the	kind	of	thing	(of	course)	that	can	happen	to	non-relativistic	quantum-mechanical	particles.		It	would	amount	(for	one	thing)	to	a	violation	of	unitarity.		But	it	is	–	for	all	that,	and	in	all	sorts	interesting	respects	-	not	very	far	from	cases	of	thoroughly	quantum-mechanical	interference	like	the	one	described	in	equation	(6).		And	a	few	obvious	further	modifications	will	get	us	-	as	literally	as	you	please	-	all	the	way	there.			 	 	 	 	 	 *		 Let’s	start	by	allowing	the	field	to	be	non-zero	at	any	number	(that	is:	any	finite	number,	or	any	countably	infinite	number,	or	any	uncountably	infinite	number,	or	even	the	entire	collection)	of	points	in	the	space	of	elementary	physical	detirminables.		The	different	possible	physical	states	of	the	world	(then)	will	consist	of	the	different	possible	configurations	of	the	field	–	the	different	possible	states	of	
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the	world	(that	is)	will	consist	of	different	possible	assignments	of	field-values	to	every	one	of	the	continuous	infinity	of	points	in	the	space	of	the	elementary	physical	detirminables.		And	let’s	suppose	that	the	field	F(λ,μ),	at	any	point	(λ,μ)	in	the	space	of	elementary	physical	detirminables,	can	take	on	complex	values,	and	let’s	suppose	that	there	is	a	law	(or	perhaps	an	initial	condition)	to	the	effect	that	the	integral	of	|F(λ,μ)|2,	over	the	entirety	of	the	two-dimensional	space	of	detirminables,	at	any	particular	temporal	instant,	is	equal	to	1.				Now,	every	function	of	λ	and	μ	that	obeys	the	above	stipulations	can	–	as	a	matter	of	pure	mathematics	-	be	represented	as	a	unique	vector,	of	length	1,	in	an	infinite-dimensional	Hilbert	space.		And	we	can	define	–	in	the	familiar	way	-	an	inner	product	on	that	space.		And	with	that	mathematical	apparatus	in	hand,	we	can	stipulate	that	the	evolution	of	the	vector	that	represents	the	field-configuration	of	the	world	in	time	is	given	by	some	deterministic	and	linear	and	unitary	time-translation	operator	whose	infinitesimal	generator	is	a	Hermetian	operator	on	that	space	called	(by	analogy	with	it’s	classical	counterpart)	a	Hamiltonian.		And	now,	at	last,	what	we	have	in	front	of	us,	in	all	its	glory,	is	what	is	usually	referred	to	as	the	Quantum	Theory	of	a	pair	of	non-relativistic	structureless	spin-zero	particles,	floating	around,	and	interacting	with	one	another,	in	a	one-dimensional	“physical	space”.		But	what	that	theory	actually	appears	to	be	about,	if	you	come	at	it	by	way	of	the	simple	and	mechanical	and	flat-footed	route	that	we	have	been	following	here,	is	a	field.		And	the	space	of	points	on	which	that	field	is	
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defined,	the	space	of	points	at	which	that	field	takes	on	values,	has	two	dimensions	rather	than	one.		And	all	of	the	familiar	talk	of	particles	floating	around	in	a	one-dimensional	space	has	to	do	with	the	way	things	look	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	space	of	ordinary	material	bodies	–	which	(again)	is	something	other,	and	smaller,	
less	fundamental	than	the	stage	on	which	the	full	history	of	the	world	plays	itself	out,	and	which	emerges	as	a	by-product	of	the	action	of	the	Hamiltonian.			 	 	 	 	 	 *		 This	picture	of	the	wave-function	as	concrete	physical	stuff	may	seem	hard	to	fit	together,	at	first,	with	what	one	thinks	one	knows	about	quantum	mechanics.		Consider	(for	example)	the	question	of	observables.		We	are	told	–	in	standard	presentations	of	quantum	mechanics	-	that	no	measurement	can	distinguish,	with	certainty,	between	a	system	in	the	state	F(q1…qN)	a	system	in	the	state	F’(q1…qN)	unless	the	vectors	representing	F(q1…qN)	and	F’(q1…qN)	happen	to	be	orthogonal	to	one	another.		But	why	in	the	world	–	on	this	new	way	of	thinking	-	should	anything	like	that	be	the	case?		If	these	F(q1…qN)’s	are	really	concrete	physical	stuff	–	as	opposed	to	abstract	mathematical	descriptions	of	the	states	of	something	else	-	why	is	it	that	anything	should	stand	in	the	way	of	our	measuring	the	amplitude	of	that	stuff,	to	any	accuracy	we	like,	at	any	point	we	please,	just	as	we	routinely	do	with	(say)	electromagnetic	fields?		Let’s	see.		
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	The	crucial	point	(it	turns	out)	is	that	the	very	idea	of	measurement	is	inextricably	bound	up	with	the	space	of	ordinary	material	things.		The	point	(more	precisely)	is	that	in	order	for	this	or	that	physical	quantity	to	count	as	something	
measurable,	there	must	be	possible	physical	processes	whereby	the	value	of	that	quantity	can	reliably	be	brought	into	correlation	with	the	positions	of	ordinary	
material	objects	(the	positions	of	pointers,	the	distributions	of	ink-molecules	on	pieces	of	paper,	etc.)	in	the	space	of	ordinary	material	things.		Let’s	start	with	a	simple	paradigm	case	-	from	which	(thereafter)	the	reader	can	easily	generalize,	as	much	as	she	pleases,	for	herself.								Suppose	(then)	that	the	symmetries	of	the	Hamiltonian	of	the	world	entail	that	the	space	of	ordinary	material	bodies	happens	to	be	1-dimensional,	as	in	the	examples	that	we	were	considering	above.		And	divide	the	qi	into	three	disjoint	sets:	the	‘pointer’	set	{q1},	and	the	‘object’	set	{q2….qO},	and	the	‘rest-of-the-world’	set	{qO+1…..qN}.		And	posit	a	single	very	simple	connection	–	a	single	very	simple	rule	of	
correspondence	-	between	the	field-configuration	in	the	space	of	elementary	physical	detirminables	and	our	everyday	empirical	experience	of	the	world,	to	wit:	the	‘pointer’	particle	is	at	or	around	position	x	in	the	space	of	ordinary	material	things	if	
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and	only	if	F(q1…qN)	vanishes,	or	almost	vanishes,	outside	of	the	region	bounded	by	(q1	=	x-	ε)	and	(q1	=	x	+	ε),	where	ε	is	small.6		That	(it	turns	out)	will	be	all	we	need.		Now,	two	different	field-configurations	of	the	‘object’,	f(q2….qO)	and	f’(q2….qO),	can	be	distinguished	from	one	another	by	a	measurement	if	and	only	if	there	is	at	least	one	possible	field-configuration	of	the	‘pointer+rest-of-the-world’	–	call	it	g(q1,	qO+1…..qN)	-		such	that	if	the	field-configuration	of	the	world	at	t0	is	g(q1,	qO+1…..qN)	f(q2….qO),	then	the	pointer	particle	ends	up,	at	a	certain	later	time	t1,	at	the	point	x,	and	if	the	field-configuration	of	the	world	at	t0	is	g(q1,	qO+1…..qN)	f’(q2….qO),	then	the	pointer	particle	ends	up,	at	that	same	later	time	t1,	at	the	point	y,	where	the	distance	between	x	and	y	is	much	greater	than	ε.7				And	it	follows	from	the	above	correspondence	rule	that	any	F(q1…qN)	in	which	the	pointer	particle	is	located	at	x	is	orthogonal	(or	nearly	so)	to	any	F(q1…qN)	in																																																									6	The	thought	here	harks	back	to	our	discussion	of	the	system	described	by	the	classical	Hamiltonian	in	equation	(4).	The	thought	(that	is)	is	that	the	‘pointer’	particle	is	at	or	around	x	if	and	only	if	all	of	what	we	were	previously	calling	the	‘scenarios’	combined	in	F(q1…qN),	or	almost	all	of	them,	or	almost	all	of	an	appropriately	weighted	combination	of	them,	agree	that	it	is.		This	particular	rule	of	correspondence	(by	the	way)	will	be	appropriate	to	versions	of	quantum	mechanics	–	like	the	GRW	theory	-	whose	fundamental	ontologies	consist	exclusively	of	the	fields	F(q1…qN).		For	theories	like	Bohmian	Mechanics	–	which	have	richer	fundamental	ontologies	–	a	different	rule	will	be	appropriate.		But	the	reader	who	is	familiar	with	Bohmian	Mechanics	will	have	no	trouble	in	confirming	for	herself	that	an	argument	very	much	analogous	to	the	one	that	follows,	and	which	arrives,	in	the	end,	at	exactly	the	same	conclusion,	can	be	constructed	in	that	theory	as	well.	7	The	“if”	here	is	just	a	matter	of	reflecting	on	what	it	means	to	distinguish	between	two	situations	by	means	of	a	measurement	–	but	the	“only	if”	requires	a	somewhat	more	elaborate	argument.		The	interested	reader	can	find	such	an	argument	on	pages	89-91	of	a	recent	book	of	mine	called	After	Physics.	
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which	the	pointer	particle	is	located	at	y.			And	so	it	will	follow	from	the	above	analysis	of	what	it	is	to	be	able	to	distinguish	between	f(q2….qO)	and	f’(q2….qO)	by	means	of	a	measurement,	and	from	the	stipulation	the	universal	operator	of	time-translation	is	unitary,	that	f(q2….qO)	and	f’(q2….qO)	can	only	be	distinguished	from	one	another	by	means	of	a	measurement	if	they	are	orthogonal	to	one	another.		And	it	will	follow	from	that	that	if	f(q2….qO)	and	f’(q2….qO)	can	be	distinguished	from	one	another	by	means	of	a	measurement,	then	there	must	be	some	Hermetian	operator	of	which	both	f(q2….qO)	and	f’(q2….qO)	are	eigenfunctions,	with	different	eigenvalues.				And	from	there,	without	too	much	further	trouble,	one	can	recover	the	entirety	of	the	algebra	of	the	quantum-mechanical	observables.							 	 	 	 	 	 2	
	Here’s	what’s	happened	so	far:				We	started	off	by	looking	at	two	ways	of	representing	a	classical	system	with	two	dynamical	degrees	of	freedom,	whose	Hamiltonian	consists	of	the	standard	kinetic	energy	terms	and	a	simple	contact	interaction.		One	of	these	represents	the	
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system	as	a	pair	of	particles	floating	around	in	a	one-dimensional	space	of	ordinary	material	bodies,	and	the	other	represents	the	system	by	means	of	a	single	point-like	physical	item	in	the	two-dimensional	space	–	the	space	of	the	possible	one-dimensional	configurations	of	the	pair	of	particles	floating	around	in	the	space	of	ordinary	material	bodies.		Because	these	two	ways	of	representing	the	system	are	both	complete,	and	because	they	are	fully	mathematically	equivalent	to	one	another,	and	because	the	two-dimensional	representation	looks	(in	all	sorts	of	ways)	less	natural,	and	less	familiar,	and	less	like	the	manifest	image	of	the	world	than	the	one-dimensional	representation	does,	there	seemed	to	be	no	compelling	reason	to	take	the	two-dimensional	space	philosophically	seriously.		But	as	soon	as	we	imagine	an	additional	point-like	physical	item	floating	around	in	the	two-dimensional	space,	all	of	this	abruptly	changes.		Once	the	two-dimensional	space	is	inhabited	by	more	than	a	single	such	item,	the	one-dimensional	representation	and	the	two-dimensional	representation	are	no	longer	mathematically	equivalent	to	one	another	–	and	each	of	them	seems	to	have	a	distinct	and	philosophically	interesting	role	to	play.			The	one-dimensional	space	is	still	the	space	of	ordinary	material	bodies	–	but	the	representation	of	the	system	in	that	space	is	no	longer	mathematically	complete.		And	the	smallest	space	in	which	the	system	can	be	represented	in	a	complete	and	separable	way8	–	the	space	(that	is)	of	the	elementary	physical	detirminables	-	is	now	two-dimensional.	
																																																								8	What	it	means	for	a	representation	to	be	separable,	by	the	way,	is	for	that	representation	to	take	the	form	of	a	spatial	distribution	of	local	physical	properties.		
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	Moreover,	the	general	direction	of	these	changes	is	unmistakably	quantum-
mechanical.		It	turns	out	that	adding	another	concrete	point-like	fundamental	physical	item	to	the	higher-dimensional	space	is	not	so	much	like	adding	more	
concrete	physical	material	to	the	lower-dimensional	space	as	it	is	like	adding	another	low-dimensional	world,	or	another	actualized	low-dimensional	possibility,	or	another	term	in	a	quantum-mechanical	superposition.		And	these	different	possibilities	can	be	made	to	interact	with	one	another,	in	ways	that	are	very	much	reminiscent	of	quantum-mechanical	interference,	by	means	of	the	addition	of	another	very	simple	term	to	the	Hamiltonian.		And	the	addition	of	such	a	term	also	generates	distinctly	quantum-mechanical	sorts	of	non-locality,	and	distinctly	quantum-mechanical	images	of	measurement,	and	so	on.				And	(on	top	of	that)	it	happens	to	be	a	characteristic	of	classical	physical	theories	that	the	space	of	ordinary	material	things	and	the	space	of	elementary	physical	detirminables	are	exactly	and	invariably	one	and	the	same.			And	it	seems	natural	to	wonder	whether	all	of	this	points	to	some	kind	of	a	diagnosis,	or	some	kind	of	an	
explanation,	of	the	actual	un-classical	weirdness	of	the	world.		It	seems	natural	to	wonder	(that	is)	whether	it	is	precisely	this	coming-apart	of	the	space	of	ordinary	material	things	and	the	space	of	elementary	physical	determinables	that	turns	out	to	be	at	the	bottom	of	everything	that’s	exceedingly	and	paradigmatically	strange	about	quantum	mechanics.																																																																																																																																																																						What	it	means	(that	is)	for	a	representation	to	be	separable,	in	the	language	I	introduced	a	few	pages	back,	is	for	it	not	to	involve	any	entanglement.	
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	But	how	can	that	possibly	be	true?		For	quantum-mechanical	systems	consisting	of	just	a	single	structureless	spin-zero	particle	(after	all)	the	space	of	ordinary	material	bodies	and	the	space	of	elementary	physical	detirminables	are	precisely	one	and	the	same,	just	as	they	are	for	classical	systems.		And	yet	a	hell	of	a	lot	of	what	everybody	agrees	is	exceedingly	and	paradigmatically	strange	about	quantum	mechanics	can	already	be	encountered	in	systems	like	that.9		And	this	will	be	worth	thinking	through	in	some	detail.		And	the	business	of	thinking	it	through	will	be	the	work	of	this	section.				Consider	(then)	a	single	structureless	particle,	in	a	3-dimensional	space	of	ordinary	material	things,	whose	quantum-mechanical	wave-function	happens	to	be	non-zero,	at	a	certain	particular	time,	in	two	separate	and	compact	and	disjoint	regions	of	that	space	called	A	and	B.			 What’s	strange	about	situations	like	that	is	that	both	of	the	following	claims	about	the	particle	in	question	are	apparently,	simultaneously,	true:			 1) There	is	a	perfectly	concrete	and	observable	sense	in	which	the	particle,	or	something	very	closely	associated	with	the	particle,	is	in																																																									9	Feynman	famously	says	(for	example)	that	the	only	mystery	in	quantum	mechanics	is	the	one	that	one	that	comes	up	in	connection	with	the	double-slit	experiment	–	and	the	double-slit	experiment	seems	(on	the	face	of	it)	to	involve	nothing	over	and	above	a	single	structureless	particle	moving	around	in	the	presence	of	a	complicated	(double-slitted)	external	potential.	
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both	regions.		(What	I	have	in	mind	here,	when	I	speak	of	a	‘concrete	and	observable’	sense	in	which	the	particle	is	in	both	regions,	is	of	course	the	possibility	of	measuring	the	effects	of	
interference	between	the	branch	of	the	wave-function	that’s	located	in	A	and	the	branch	of	the	wave-function	that’s	located	in	B	–	as,	for	example,	in	the	double-slit	experiment)	2) There	is	a	perfectly	concrete	and	observable	sense	in	which	the	particle,	and	everything	sufficiently	closely	associated	with	the	particle,	is	in	only	one	of	those	regions.		(And	what	I	have	in	mind	here,	when	I	speak	of	a	‘concrete	and	observable’	sense	in	which	the	particle	is	in	only	one	region,	is	the	fact	that	if	we	measure	the	particle’s	spatial	location,	we	will	either	find	a	particle	in	A	and	nothing	whatever	in	B,	or	we	will	find	a	particle	in	B	and	nothing	whatever	in	A)			Note	(to	begin	with)	that	there	is	nothing	particularly	unintelligible,	in	and	of	itself,	about	claim	(1).		(1)	is	what	Bohr	and	his	circle	used	to	call	the	‘wave’	aspect	of	quantum-mechanical	particles	–	and	one	could	think	of	that,	in	the	absence	of	(2),	as	suggesting	a	novel	but	by	no	means	unfathomable	picture	of	the	subatomic	structure	of	matter,	according	to	which	particles	are	to	be	understood,	at	the	microscopic	level,	as	something	akin	to	clouds	or	fluids	or	fields	that	can	(in	certain	circumstances)	spread	themselves	out	over	finite	and	even	disjoint	regions	of	the	space	of	ordinary	material	things.		
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	What	has	always	completely	freaked	everybody	out	(on	the	other	hand)	is	the	combination	of	(1)	and	(2).		And	it	turns	out	that	all	of	the	ways	that	we	have	of	imagining	that	(1)	and	(2)	could	(somehow)	both	be	true	are	going	to	involve	telling	stories	about	systems	that	consist	of	more	than	a	single	particle,	systems	(that	is)	whose	quantum-mechanical	wave-functions	take	on	values	at	points	in	spaces	of	more	than	3	dimensions,	systems	(that	is)	for	which	the	space	of	elementary	physical	detirminables	diverges	from	the	space	of	ordinary	material	things.		Let	me	try	to	say,	a	little	more	concretely,	what	I	have	in	mind.		Note	(to	begin	with)	that	the	business	of	figuring	out	how	(1)	and	(2)	could	both	be	true	is	nothing	other	than	the	business	of	solving	the	quantum-mechanical	measurement	problem.		And	so	the	various	attempts	at	coming	to	terms	with	(1)	and	(2)	together	that	we	ought	to	have	in	the	back	of	our	minds	here	are	things	like	the	GRW	theory,	and	Bohmian	Mechanics,	and	the	Many-Worlds	interpretation.		And	it	turns	out	that	all	of	those	attempts,	and	all	of	the	strategies	that	anybody	has	ever	so	much	as	hinted	at	for	solving	the	quantum-mechanical	measurement	problem,	depend	on	the	phenomenon	of	entanglement.		And	the	phenomenon	of	entanglement	is,	as	we	have	noted	before,	and	as	a	straightforward	matter	of	definition,	the	phenomenon	of	the	divergence	of	the	space	of	elementary	physical	detirminables	from	the	space	or	ordinary	material	things.		
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Consider	(for	example)	the	case	of	Bohmian	Mechanics.		The	phenomena	that	pertain	to	(1)	have	to	do	–	in	the	context	of	Bohmian	Mechanics	–	with	the	fact	that	the	wave-function	of	the	sort	of	particle	we	were	describing	above	is	non-zero	both	in	region	A	and	in	region	B.		And	it	might	look,	at	first	glance,	as	if	the	business	of	accounting	for	the	phenomena	that	pertain	to	(2),	in	the	context	of	Bohmian	Mechanics,	amounts	to	nothing	more	than	the	simple	observation	that	–	notwithstanding	that	the	wave-function	of	this	particle	is	spread	over	both	region	A	and	region	B	–	the	Bohmian	corpuscle	itself	is	located	either	in	region	A	or	in	region	B.		And	all	of	that	can	of	course	be	presented	in	the	form	of	a	story	about	what	things	are	physically	like,	at	various	different	times,	at	various	different	points	in	the	familiar	3-dimensional	Euclidian	space	of	ordinary	material	things,	and	of	our	everyday	empirical	experience	of	the	world.	
	But	this	(on	a	little	reflection)	is	all	wrong.		What	(2)	is	about	is	not	merely	that	the	particle	is	either	in	region	A	or	in	region	B,	but	(in	addition)	that	when	we	look	for	the	particle	we	see	it	either	in	region	A	or	in	region	B,	and	(moreover)	that	what	we	see	is	in	fact	reliably	correlated	with	where	the	particle	actually	is,	and	that	what	we	see	matches	up	in	the	appropriate	way	with	what	we	would	see	if	we	were	to	look	again,	and	with	what	somebody	else	would	see	if	they	were	to	look	for	
themselves,	and	with	how	the	particle	itself	will	behave	in	the	future,	and	so	on.		And	if	not	for	all	that,	there	would	(indeed)	be	nothing	here	to	puzzle	over.		And	the	various	businesses	of	accounting	for	all	that,	in	the	context	of	Bohmian	Mechanics,	all	depend	(again)	on	the	fact	that	the	process	of	measurement	invariably	and	
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ineluctably	generates	quantum-mechanical	entanglements	between	the	measuring-devices	and	the	measured	particle.10																																																											10	Maybe	it	will	be	worth	taking	a	minute	to	rub	this	in.			 Suppose	that	the	initial	wave-function	of	the	composite	system	consisting	of	a	particle	(p)	and	a	measuring-device	(d),	which	is	designed	to	record	the	position	of	that	particle,	is:			 	 	 [ready>d(α[A>p	+	β[B>p),	 	 	 	 	 (i)		where	[ready>d	is	the	physical	state	of	the	system	d	in	which	d	is	plugged	in	and	properly	calibrated	and	facing	in	the	right	direction	and	in	all	other	respects	ready	to	carry	out	the	measurement	of	the	position	of	p,	and	[A>p	is	the	state	of	p	in	which	p	is	localized	in	the	spatial	region	A,	and	[B>p	is	the	state	of	p	in	which	p	is	localized	in	the	spatial	region	B.			And	note,	to	begin	with,	that	any	satisfactory	scientific	account	of	why	it	is	that	if	we	measure	the	position	of	a	particle	like	this	‘we	will	either	find	a	particle	in	A	and	nothing	whatever	in	B,	or	a	particle	in	B	and	nothing	whatever	in	A’	has	got	to	be	an	account	not	only	of	the	behavior	of	p	under	circumstances	like	(i),	but	also	of	the	behavior	of	d	under	circumstances	like	(i).	Good.		Suppose	that	p	and	d	are	allowed	to	interact	with	one	another,	in	the	familiar	way,	when	a	state	like	(i)	obtains.		Then	it	will	follow,	in	the	familiar	way,	from	the	linearity	of	the	quantum-mechanical	equations	of	motion,	and	from	the	stipulation	that	d	is	a	properly-functioning	device	for	the	measurement	and	recording	of	the	position	of	p,	that	the	state	of	this	composite	system	once	this	interaction	is	complete	will	be:					 	 α[‘A’>d[A>p	+	β[‘B’>d[B>p,	 	 	 	 	 (ii)		where	[‘A’>d	is	the	state	of	d	in	which	the	position	of	d’s	pointer	indicates	that	the	outcome	of	the	measurement	of	the	position	of	p	is	‘A’,	and	[‘B’>d	is	the	state	of	d	in	which	the	position	of	d’s	pointer	indicates	that	the	outcome	of	the	measurement	of	the	position	of	p	is	‘B’.			And	consider	how	it	is	that	Bohmian	Mechanics	manages	to	guarantee	that,	in	circumstances	like	(ii),	the	positions	of	the	Bohmain	corpuscles	that	make	up	the	pointer	of	d	are	properly	and	reliably	correlated	with	the	position	of	the	Bohmian	corpuscle	p	–	the	position	(that	is)	of	the	Bohmain	corpuscle	whose	position	has	just	now	been	measured.		Note	(in	particular)	that	that	correlation	depends	crucially	on	the	fact	that	the	wave-function	in	(ii)	vanishes	in	those	regions	of	the	configuration-space	of	the	composite	system	consisting	of	p	and	d	in	which	precisely	those	correlations	do	not	obtain.		And	note	(moreover)	that	it	must	vanish	in	those	regions	without	vanishing	throughout	those	regions	of	that	configuration-space	in	which	p	is	located	in	A,	and	without	vanishing	throughout	those	regions	of	that	configuration-space	in	which	p	is	located	in	B,	and	without	vanishing	throughout	
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	Let’s	have	a	look	at	exactly	how	that	works.		Start	with	a	single,	structureless,	particle	–	call	it	p	-	and	two	boxes.		One	of	the	boxes	is	called	A,	and	is	located	at	the	point	(x	=	+1,	y	=	0,	z	=	0),	and	the	other	is	called	B,	and	is	located	at	the	point	(x	=	-1,	y	=	0,	z	=	0).11			And	let	[A>p	be	the	state	of	p	in	which	p	is	located	in	A.		And	let	[B>p	be	the	state	of	p	in	which	p	is	located	in	B.		And	suppose	that	at	t	=	0,	the	state	of	p	is				 	 (1/√2)[A>p	+	(1/√2)	[B>p.	 	 	 	 	 	 (8)		Now,	states	like	the	one	in	(8)	famously	resist	any	interpretation	as	situations	in	which	p	is	either	in	box	A	or	in	box	B.		And	what	famously	stands	in	the	way	of	such	an	interpretation	is	the	fact	that	if	we	open	both	boxes,	when	a	state	like	(8)	obtains,	then	the	subsequent	observable	behaviors	of	the	particle	–	the	probabilities	(for	example)	of	finding	the	particle	at	this	or	that	point	in	space	–	are	in	general	going	to	be	very	different	from	the	behavior	of	a	particle	released	from	box	A,	and	very	different	(as	well)	from	the	behavior	of	a	particle	released	from	box	B,	and	very	
																																																																																																																																																																					those	regions	of	that	configuration-space	in	which	d’s	pointer	is	located	in	‘A’,	and	without	vanishing	throughout	those	regions	of	that	configuration-space	in	which	d’s	pointer	is	located	in	‘B’.		And	note	(and	this,	finally,	is	the	heart	of	the	matter)	that	the	previous	two	sentences	can	only	simultaneously	be	true	of	a	wave-function	(like	the	one	in	(ii))	in	which	p	and	d	are	quantum-mechanically	entangled	with	one	another	–	note	(that	is)	that	the	previous	two	sentences	can	only	simultaneously	be	true	of	a	wave-function	which	(like	the	one	in	(ii))	cannot	be	represented	as	a	function	over	the	points	of	any	three-dimensional	arena.	11	In	order	to	keep	things	as	simple	as	possible,	we	will	treat	these	boxes	not	as	physical	systems,	but	(rather)	as	externally	imposed	potentials	–	and	we	will	treat	the	openings	and	closings	of	those	boxes	not	as	dynamical	processes,	but	(rather)	as	
variations	in	those	externally	imposed	potentials	with	time.		
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different	(as	well)	from	anything	along	the	lines	of	a	probabilistic	sum	or	average	of	those	two	behaviors.								And	all	of	this,	as	I	mentioned	above,	can	be	explained,	in	the	context	of	Bohmain	Mechanics,	by	means	of	a	story	about	what	things	are	physically	like,	at	various	different	times,	at	various	different	points	in	the	familiar,	material,	3-dimensional	space	of	our	everyday	empirical	experience	of	the	world.		The	particle	itself	starts	out	in	either	box	A	or	box	B	–	but	it’s	wave-function,	it’s	so-called	pilot-wave	-	is	non-zero	(when	a	state	like	(8)	obtains)	in	both	boxes.		And	so,	when	the	boxes	are	opened,	and	the	two	branches	of	the	wave-function	flow	outwards,	and	fill	up	the	three-dimensional	space	around	them,	and	overlap	with	one	another,	they	interfere	–	and	that	interference	observably	affects	the	motion	of	the	particle	that	those	two	branches,	together,	are	guiding.		 And	the	puzzle	(again)	is	that	measuring	the	position	of	a	particle	like	that	somehow	makes	one	or	the	other	of	those	branches	go	away.		And	the	question	is	
how.		The	question	(to	put	it	as	naively	and	as	literally	and	as	flat-footedly	as	one	can)	is	where,	exactly,	that	other	branch	goes.			Consider	(then)	a	radically	simplified	stand-in	for	a	measuring-device	–	call	it	M	-	which	consists	(just	as	in	the	case	we	considered	before)	of	a	single	structureless	particle,	and	which	is	constrained	(we	will	suppose)	to	move	along	the	X-axis.		And	let	[ready>M	be	the	state	of	M	in	which	M	is	located	at	the	point	(x	=	0,	y	=	0,	z	=	0),	
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and	let	[‘A’>M	be	the	state	of	M	in	which	M	is	located	at	(x	=	+1/2,	y	=	0,	z	=	0),	and	let	[‘B’>M	be	the	state	of	M	in	which	M	is	located	at	(x	=	-1/2,	y	=	0,	z	=	0).		And	suppose	that	the	kinetic	term	in	the	Hamiltonian	of	M	happens	to	be	identically	zero.		And	suppose	that	there	is	an	interaction	between	M	and	p,	which	we	can	switch	‘on’	and	‘off’	as	we	please,	and	which	(when	it’s	switched	‘on’)	produces	(over	the	course	of,	say,	the	ensuing	second)	evolutions	like	this:12		[ready>M[A>p	---->[‘A’>M[A>p		and		[ready>M[B>p	---->[‘B’>M[B>p																	(9)		When	the	interaction	is	switched	‘on’	(then)	M	will	function,	at	least	under	the	sorts	of	circumstances	envisioned	above,	as	a	measuring-instrument	for	the	position	of	p.			 Note	that	whereas	the	space	of	the	elementary	physical	determinables	of	a	single	structureless	quantum-mechanical	particle	p	is	three-dimensional,	the	space	of	the	elementary	physical	determinables	of	the	composite	quantum-mechanical	system	consisting	of	p	and	M	–	call	that	FpM	–	is	going	to	be	four-dimensional.		We	can	assign	unique	addresses	to	points	in	that	arena	using	the	three	co-ordinates	(call	them	xp,	yp,	and	zp)	that	correspond	to	the	parochial	three-dimensional	
																																																								12	Here	again,	just	to	keep	things	simple,	we	are	going	to	treat	the	business	of	turning	this	interaction	‘on’	and	‘off’	not	as	a	variation	in	any	dynamical	degree	of	freedom,	but	(rather)	as	a	variation	in	an	externally	imposed	effective	Hamiltonian.		None	of	these	simplifications	–	as	the	reader	can	easily	confirm	for	herself	–	involves	any	loss	in	generality.	
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‘position	of	p’	and	one	more	(call	it	xM)	that	corresponds	to	the	parochial	one-dimensional	‘position	of	M’.			 Suppose	that	we	initially	that	prepare	composite	system	in	the	state						 	 	 [ready>M	((1/√2)[A>p	+	(1/√2)	[B>p),	 	 	 (10)		with	the	interaction	switched	‘off’,	and	then	open	the	boxes.		In	this	case,	the	M	remains	completely	unentangled	with	p,	and	once	the	boxes	are	opened,	one	branch	of	the	wave-function	of	the	composite	system	will	spread	outward	from	the	point	(xp	=	+1,	yp	=0,	zp	=	0,	xM	=	0),	and	the	other	branch	will	spread	outward	from	the	point	(xp	=	-1,	yp	=0,	zp	=	0,	xM	=	0),	and	each	of	them	will	fill	up	the	three-dimensional	hypersurface	xM	=	0	of	the	determinable	space	of	the	composite	system,	and	they	will	overlap	with	one	another,	and	interfere	with	one	another,	and	both	of	them	will	contribute	to	determining	the	Bohmain	trajectory	of	the	world-particle.		(And	note	that	all	this	–	except	for	the	presence	of	the	world-particle	itself	–	is	exactly	analogous	to	what	was	going	on	in	the	system	described	by	the	Hamiltonian	in	equation	(7)	when	particles	2	and	4	are	both	at	the	origin)			 If	(on	the	other	hand)	we	initially	prepare	the	composite	system	in	the	state	in	(8)	with	the	interaction	switched	‘on’,	then	it	will	follow	from	(9),	together	with	the	linearity	of	the	quantum-mechanical	equations	of	motion,	that	the	state	of	p+M	will	become	
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		 	 	 (1/√2)[‘A’>M[A>p	+	(1/√2)[‘B’>M[B>p	 	 	 (11)		Now	M	and	p	are	maximally	entangled	with	one	another,	and	if	the	boxes	are	opened	at	this	point,	then	one	branch	of	the	wave-function	of	the	composite	system	will	spread	outward	from	the	point	(xp	=	+1,	yp	=0,	zp	=	0,	xM	=	+	1/2),	and	fill	up	the	three-dimensional	hypersurface	xM	=	+1/2,	and	the	other	branch	will	spread	outward	from	the	point	(xp	=	-1,	yp	=0,	zp	=	0,	xM	=	-1/2),	and	fill	up	the	three-dimensional	hypersurface	xM	=	-1/2,	and	the	two	will	not	overlap	with	one	another,	and	will	not	interfere	with	one	another,	and	only	one	of	them	–	the	one	that’s	non-zero	on	the	hypersurface	where	the	world-particle	happens	to	be	located	-	will	contribute	to	determining	the	trajectory.		And	the	reader	should	note	that	it	is	absolutely	critical	to	the	way	all	this	works	–	it	is	absolutely	critical	(in	particular)	to	the	very	idea	of	an	entangling	of	the	measuring-device	with	the	measured	particle	–	that	the	dimension	of	the	determinable	space	along	which	the	wave-function	spreads	out	when	M	is	in	motion	is	orthogonal	to	all	of	the	dimensions	of	that	space	in	which	the	wave-function	spreads	out	when	p	is	in	motion.		(And	note	that	this	–	except	(again)	for	the	presence	of	the	world-particle	itself	–	is	exactly	analogous	to	what	was	going	on	in	the	system	described	by	the	Hamiltonian	in	equation	(7)	when	the	attractive	potential	is	switched	on)			 And	so	the	answer	to	the	question	of	where	the	other	branch	goes,	when	we	measure	the	position	of	p,	is	literally,	and	flat-footedly,	that	it	gets	pushed	off	into	
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another	dimension.		And	this	(in	microcosm)	is	the	sort	of	thing	that	happens	
whenever	we	do	measurements	on	quantum-mechanical	systems.		What’s	strange	about	quantum	mechanics,	what	makes	it	look	like	magic,	even	in	a	case	as	simple	as	that	of	a	single	structureless	particle,	is	that	the	three-dimensional	space	of	ordinary	material	bodies	is	too	small	to	contain	the	complete	microscopic	history	of	the	world.			And	much	the	same	sort	of	thing	is	true	on	the	GRW	theory.		This	may	seem,	at	first,	like	a	puzzling	claim.		The	reader	may	want	to	object	that	what	happens	on	the	GRW	theory	is	not	that	one	of	the	branches	gets	‘pushed	off	into	another	dimension’,	but	(rather)	that	one	of	the	branches	simply	disappears.		But	consider	the	
mechanism	of	that	disappearance.		The	wave-function	of	the	world,	which	is	a	function	of	position	in	the	space	of	elementary	physical	determinables,	is	multiplied	by	another	function,	the	so-called	‘hitting’	function	–	which	is	also	a	function	of	position	in	the	space	of	elementary	physical	determinables.		And	this	multiplication	of	the	wave-function	by	the	hitting	function	somehow	manages	to	leave	one	of	the	above	branches	of	the	wave-function	intact,	and	causes	the	other	one	to	vanish.		And	that	can	only	occur	if	these	two	branches	of	the	wave-function,	which	overlap	everywhere	in	the	3-dimensional	space	of	ordinary	material	bodies,	somehow	manage	not	to	overlap	anywhere	in	the	space	of	elementary	physical	detirminables.		And	that	can	only	occur	if	the	space	of	elementary	physical	determinables	has	at	least	one	more	dimension	than	the	space	of	ordinary	material	bodies	–	and	if	the	
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two	branches	have	somehow	become	separated	from	one	another	along	that	additional	dimension.			And	the	reader	can	confirm	for	herself	that	much	the	same	thing	would	be	true,	as	well,	on	the	many-worlds	interpretation	of	quantum	mechanics	–	if	the	many-worlds	interpretation	were	not	otherwise	incoherent.		And	so,	at	the	end	of	the	day,	there	does	seem	to	be	an	intimate	and	invariable	connection	between	the	coming-apart	of	the	space	of	ordinary	material	things	and	the	space	of	elementary	physical	determinables	(on	the	one	hand)	and	everything	that’s	exceedingly	and	paradigmatically	strange	about	quantum	mechanics	(on	the	other).			Quantum-mechanical	sorts	of	behavior	seem	to	require	that	the	space	of	the	elementary	physical	determinables	is	bigger	than	the	space	of	ordinary	material	things	–	and	whenever	the	space	of	the	elementary	physical	determinables	space	is	bigger	than	the	space	of	ordinary	material	things,	quantum-mechanical	sorts	of	behavior	seem	to	quickly	ensue.		And	it	begins	to	look	as	if	what	we	have	stumbled	across	here	is	(indeed)	a	diagnosis,	or	an	explanation,	of	the	fact	that	the	world	is	quantum-mechanical.				 	 	 	 	 	 3		Let’s	see	where	all	this	leaves	us.	
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	The	fact	that	the	space	of	the	elementary	physical	determinables	of	the	world	and	the	space	of	the	ordinary	material	bodies	of	the	world	are	conceptually	distinct	from	one	another	–	the	fact	that	there	is	no	a	priori	reason	whatever	why	they	should	coincide	with	one	another,	or	have	the	same	topology	as	one	another,	or	have	the	same	dimensionality	as	one	another	–	is	a	purely	logical	point,	a	point	which	might	in	principle	have	been	noticed,	by	means	of	purely	conceptual	analysis,	long	before	the	empirical	discoveries	that	gave	rise	to	quantum	mechanics.		And	we	have	seen	how	easy	it	is,	merely	by	playing	around	with	the	simplest	imaginable	Hamiltonians	of	classical	Newtonian	particles,	to	stumble	onto	physical	systems	for	which	the	space	of	the	elementary	physical	determinables	has	a	different	number	of	dimensions	than	the	space	of	ordinary	material	bodies.		But	(as	I	have	already	remarked)	there	is	nothing	mysterious	or	surprising	about	this	distinction’s	having	in	fact	gone	unnoticed	as	long	as	it	did.		It	is	(after	all)	a	fundamental	principle	of	the	Manifest	Image	of	the	World	–	and	all	the	more	so	(indeed)	because	we	are	not	even	aware	of	ever	actually	having	adopted	it	–	that	the	material	space	of	the	world	and	the	determinable	space	of	the	world	are	exactly	the	same	thing.		And	that	principle	has	since	been	endorsed,	and	further	fortified,	in	the	course	of	scientific	investigation,	by	Newtonian	Mechanics,	and	by	Maxwellian	Electrodynamics,	and	by	the	Special	and	General	theories	of	Relativity,	and	even	(in	so	far	as	these	can	be	considered	in	isolation	from	quantum	mechanics)	by	the	high-dimensional	geometries	of	string	theory,	and	(indeed)	by	the	entire	edifice	of	classical	physics.		You	might	even	say	that	the	principle	that	the	material	space	of	the	world	and	the	
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determinable	space	of	the	world	are	exactly	the	same	thing	is	the	very	essence	of	the	classical	picture	of	the	world,	and	the	simplest	and	most	illuminating	way	of	pointing	to	what	sets	it	apart	from	quantum	mechanics.		But	the	relationship	between	the	material	space	and	the	determinable	one	is	(for	all	that,	and	for	the	Nth	time)	an	obviously	contingent	matter.		And	one	of	the	lessons	of	the	simple	exercises	we	have	been	working	our	way	through	here	is	that	
the	moment	that	we	take	that	in,	the	moment	that	we	even	raise	the	question	of	what	the	world	might	be	like	if	those	two	spaces	differed	from	one	another,	something	paradigmatically	quantum-mechanical	just	flops	right	out.		And	it	seems	fair	to	say	that	if	the	conceptual	distinction	between	material	space	of	the	world	and	the	determinable	space	of	the	world	had	made	itself	clear	to	anybody	(say)	a	hundred	and	fifty	years	ago,	then	the	20th	century	physics	of	sub-atomic	particles	might	have	amounted	to	less	of	a	shock	than,	in	fact,	it	did	–	it	seems	fair	to	say	(that	is)	that	the	
elucidation	of	the	conceptual	distinction	between	the	material	space	of	the	world	and	the	determinable	space	of	the	world	offers	us	a	way	of	looking	at	quantum	mechanics	as	something	natural,	and	beautiful,	and	simple,	and	understandable,	and	maybe	even	to	be	expected.		Indeed,	in	the	light	of	the	sorts	of	considerations	that	we	have	been	through	here	–	the	Classical	case	is	the	one	that	looks	exceptional,	and	conspiratorial,	and	surprising.		
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None	of	this	(mind	you)	seems	to	me	point	in	the	direction	of	any	different	or	
deeper	or	more	general	or	more	fundamental	theory	from	which	quantum	mechanics	might	imaginably	be	derived.				If	what	I	have	been	attempting	here	succeeds,	then	what	it	does	for	quantum	mechanics	is	(rather)	something	along	the	lines	of	what	Minkowski	did	for	Special	Relativity:	It	takes	a	finished	and	well-formulated	fundamental	physical	theory	–	a	theory	which	is	in	no	strictly	logical	or	empirical	need	of	any	further	elaboration	–	and	offers	us	a	crisp	and	elegant	and	profound	way	summing	up	what	the	theory	is	telling	us	about	the	world,	a	way	of	saying	what	the	theory	means,	a	way	of	isolating	(you	might	say)	its	essence.		And	what	I	take	myself	to	be	proposing	here	is	an	account	of	the	essence	–	in	exactly	the	sense	just	described	–	of	quantum	theory.				 	 	 	 	 	 *		 Here’s	another	way	to	put	it:		What	I	take	myself	to	be	proposing	here	is	a	better	and	more	straightforward	and	more	intuitive	way	of	teaching	quantum	mechanics.		The	idea	(in	a	nutshell)	is	that	it	helps	to	picture	the	concrete	fundamental	physical	stuff	of	the	world	as	floating	around	in	something	other,	and	larger,	and	more	fundamental,	than	the	space	of	ordinary	material	bodies	–	because	picturing	things	that	way	makes	it	easy	to	see	why	everything	looks	so	odd,	and	why	it	looks	odd	in	a	paradigmatically	
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quantum-mechanical	sort	of	way,	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	space	of	ordinary	material	bodies.			Of	course,	the	observation	that	it	helps	to	picture	things	in	a	certain	way	doesn’t	settle	any	questions,	in	and	of	itself,	about	how	things	actually	are.		But	it	isn’t	
irrelevant	to	such	questions	either.		And	what	it	suggests,	I	think,	is	that	any	attempt	at	insisting	on	the	contrary,	any	attempt	(that	is)	at	insisting	that	the	habitation	of	the	concrete	fundamental	physical	stuff	of	the	world	is	the	familiar	3-dimensional	space	of	ordinary	material	bodies,	any	attempt	(for	example)	at	thinking	about	the	quantum-mechanical	wave-function	as	something	merely	nomic,	or	as	some	incredibly	complicated	kind	of	a	property	of	ordinary	material	particles,	or	as	a	
multi-field,	or	what	have	you,	is	likely	to	come	at	a	steep	cost	in	terms	of	explanation	and	understanding.		What	we	saw	in	the	early	sections	of	this	paper	was	that	a	pair	of	concrete	point-like	physical	items,	floating	around	in	a	2-dimensional	space,	in	accord	with	a	simple,	classical,	local	Hamiltonian	like	the	one	in	equation	(6),	can	give	rise	to	paradigmatically	quantum-mechanical	weirdness	in	an	emergent	one-dimensional	space	of	ordinary	material	bodies.		The	ordinary	material	“shadows”	of	those	items	move	around	in	the	one-dimensional	space	as	if	they	were	interacting	with	one	another	non-locally,	and	collide	with	one	another,	or	fail	to	collide	with	one	another,	according	to	rules	that	cannot	be	written	down	in	terms	of	their	intrinsic	physical	
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properties,	and	seem	to	be	organized	into	parallel	possible	worlds	or	scenarios	that	can	nevertheless	interfere	with	one	another,	and	so	on.				On	a	“primitive	ontological”	version	of	a	world	like	this	one,	all	that	there	really	actually	ontologically	is	are	ordinary	material	particles	in	the	one-dimensional	space	–	and	we	are	offered	nothing	along	the	lines	of	an	explanation	of	the	behaviors	of	those	particles	at	all.			The	fact	that	those	particles	behave	in	the	baroque	and	astonishing	ways	that	they	do	-	the	fact	that	they	behave	(that	is)	as	if	they	were	shadows	of	a	concrete	point-like	physical	items	floating	around	in	a	two-dimensional	space	–	is	stipulated	to	be	a	matter	of	fundamental	physical	law.		Period.13		And	on	a	“multi-field”	version	of	a	world	like	this	one,	the	elementary	and	indivisible	and	not-further-analyzable	concrete	physical	items	of	the	world	of	the	world	–	or	some	of	them,	at	any	rate14	-	are	supposed	to	be	located,	in	a	way	that	resists	any	straightforward	attempt	at	visualization,	at	pairs	of	points	in	the	fundamental	one-dimensional	physical	space	of	the	world.																																																										13	The	details	of	a	“primitive	ontological”	version	of	a	world	like	this	one	are	going	to	depend,	of	course,	on	exactly	how	we	end	up	solving	the	measurement	problem.		On	a	primitive	ontological	version	of	Bohmain	Mechanics	(for	example)	there	are	going	to	be	two	ordinary	material	particles	floating	around	in	the	one-dimensional	space,	whereas	on	a	primitive	ontological	version	of	a	Many-Worlds	theory	there	will	be	four,	and	on	a	primitive	ontological	version	of	a	theory	of	the	collapse	of	the	wave-function,	there	will	be	four,	two	of	which	eventually	go	away.	14	Here	again	–	as	in	footnote	13	–	the	details	are	going	to	depend	on	exactly	how	we	end	up	solving	the	measurement	problem.	
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But	if	we	imagine	that	the	fundamental	concrete	physical	stuff	of	a	world	like	this	one	is	actually	floating	around	in	the	two-dimensional	space,	then	the	strange	and	complicated	one-dimensional	appearances	can	be	understood,	in	the	manner	of	all	of	the	best	and	deepest	and	most	satisfying	scientific	explanations	we	have,	in	terms	of	a	simple	and	literal	and	mechanical	picture	–	the	sort	of	picture	(that	is)	that	one	can	draw	on	a	piece	of	paper	-	of	what’s	going	on	underneath	the	surface	of	those	appearances.		And	exactly	the	same	sorts	of	considerations	can	be	applied	to	the	full	mathematical	formalism	of	quantum	mechanics,	and	to	any	of	the	various	solutions	that	have	been	proposed	to	the	measurement	problem.									
